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Abstract: This paper exposes missing interconnections between the urban, national and 1 
international scales in the analysis of climate adaptation policy and territorial governance in 2 
the United Kingdom (UK). Drawing upon the results of interviews with adaptation 3 
stakeholders in seven UK city-regions, it examines: (i) the increasing discursive alignment of 4 
the ‘urban’ and the ‘national’ in international climate adaptation policy and decision-making 5 
processes; and (ii) the contradictions between urban and national climate policy discourses 6 
across the UK devolved territories. The paper identifies and accounts for an emergent scalar 7 
geopolitics of climate adaptation governance as urban climate actions and knowledges are 8 
enrolled in the UK state’s efforts to respond to broader international climate governance and 9 
policy imperatives. We call for further research on how adaptation knowledge is 10 
geopolitically mobilized at different scales of climate governance. 11 
 12 
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I INTRODUCTION 26 
The theoretical and empirical complications of unravelling territory, politics and governance 27 
in trying to understand the shortfalls of modern liberal statecraft and geopolitics have been 28 
well-documented in the literature on territory, governance and politics (Dodds, 2018; Woon, 29 
2019). Such geopolitics – enshrined in neoliberal territorial bordering practices of state 30 
sovereignty – have important repercussions for environmental governance futures especially 31 
at the national and urban scales. Research has also revealed the (dystopian) post-peak oil 32 
socio-political imaginaries we could expect from environmental degradation caused by 33 
climate change (Harmer, 2018). Anthropogenic actions of political and environmental 34 
instability have resulted in (geo)political institutions and mechanisms of the state having to 35 
anticipate – but moreover cope and react with – non-linearity and non-stationarity because of 36 
rapid ecological changes (Dalby, 2019) caused by ‘carboniferous capitalism’ (Dalby, 2013b). 37 
Hence, no longer can our physical and political environments be seen and studied as mutually 38 
exclusive fixed spatial entities; likewise socio-spatial relations, such as economy-39 
environment relations, are not just sites of experimental practice, but also objects and means 40 
of scalar and territorial governance (Jessop, 2016). However, little empirical work has been 41 
conducted on how climate adaptation governance in its broadest sense (e.g. adaptation 42 
science/knowledge) fits within the wider scalar politics and governance of climate change 43 
operating within and across state territories. This paper aims to bridge this gap in knowledge 44 
of climate governance and geopolitics. 45 
 46 
Hitherto the geopolitics of climate governance has been principally framed by hegemonic 47 
discourses of the free market and global capitalism, where climate policy is shaped by 48 
international free markets and inter-state competition (Kahn, 2013). Nonetheless, there are 49 
increasing signs that protectionist trade policies are on the rise (e.g. President Donald 50 
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Trump’s ‘Making America Great Again’ and the United Kingdom leaving the European 51 
Union or ‘Brexit’). Such politics are accompanied by geopolitical discourses signalling, in 52 
effect, a hardening of borders, which often translate into weak interpretations of sustainability 53 
and corresponding discourses of carbon control and mitigation at the urban scale as cities 54 
increasingly take on the initiative of climate governance, thereby colonizing the policy space 55 
vacated by the nation state (Jonas et al., 2011; Johnson, 2018a). Accordingly, many 56 
commentators now position cities as leaders on climate adaptation (e.g. through experimental 57 
governance systems) and national adaptation policy as a response to wider geopolitical 58 
pressures rather than domestic urban politics (Bulkeley, 2013; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; 59 
Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Keohane and Victor, 2016). 60 
However, treating the urban as a discrete scale of climate governance operating 61 
independently from the national can be just as problematic as seeing the international scale as 62 
determining what cities do to tackle climate change. 63 
 64 
In this paper, we focus on exposing some missing interconnections between the urban, 65 
national and international scales in the analysis of climate adaptation policy and territorial 66 
governance in the United Kingdom (UK). Drawing upon the results of interviews with 67 
adaptation stakeholders in seven UK city-regions, we examine: (i) the increasing discursive 68 
alignment of the ‘urban’ and the ‘national’ in international climate adaptation policy and 69 
decision-making processes; and (ii) the contradictions between urban and national climate 70 
policy discourses across the UK devolved territories. In doing so, the paper identifies and 71 
accounts for an emergent scalar geopolitics of climate governance as urban climate actions 72 
and knowledges are enrolled in the UK state’s efforts to respond to international climate 73 
adaptation governance and policy.  74 
 75 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II draws together the literature on 76 
adaptation and the scalar politics of climate governance in order to (re)establish connections 77 
between urban, national and international scales of analysis. Section III justifies the choice of 78 
case study city-regions across the different national territories of the UK and the methods 79 
utilized for the research. Section IV utilizes document analysis and interviews with UK 80 
adaptation stakeholders to empirically illustrate missing connections between scales, namely 81 
urban, national and international climate policy and governance. We also highlight how 82 
national and urban spaces across the UK are colonized by conflicting climate adaptation 83 
policy and governance discourses. In doing so, we animate a broader scalar geopolitics in 84 
which urban forms of climate adaptation governance in the UK are differently mobilized by 85 
the national state at various scales of climate governance. 86 
 87 
II CITIES, ADAPTATION AND THE SCALAR GEOPOLITICS OF CLIMATE 88 
GOVERNANCE 89 
This section critical examines how cities (and city-regions) are being positioned as climate 90 
policy leaders often at the expense of knowledge of the nation state. It then addresses the 91 
scalar politics of climate governance, highlighting connections and tension between urban 92 
climate actions and processes of state internationalisation and devolution.  93 
 94 
2.1 Cities and the governance of climate adaptation 95 
The governance of climate adaptation1 is arguably far more difficult than that of mitigation to 96 
implement at national and urban scales given its complex human-natural dimension 97 
(Kythreotis et al., 2020). Adaptation knowledge is predicated upon risk-based analyses of 98 
 
1 Defined as “The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, 
adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural systems, human 
intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects” (IPCC, 2014b, 118) 
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geographically uneven social, cultural, economic and political factors as influenced by 99 
uncertain climate impacts (O’Brien and Leichenko, 2000).  Furthermore, adaptation is 100 
attributed both public good and social justice dimensions that make it a more nebulous, 101 
socially constructed phenomenon (Adger et al., 2009; Benzie, 2014; Bisaro and Hinkel, 2016; 102 
Eakin et al., 2014). Given that different places are entrenched within different systems of 103 
knowledge and power (politics, policy and territorial governance), different local adaptation 104 
responses can subvert and alter existing institutionalized systems of policymaking beyond the 105 
state, or even reify them so as to perpetuate existing climate vulnerabilities, ecological crises 106 
and political-economic systems (e.g. neoliberalism) (Grove, 2014; O’Lear, 2016a, 2016b). 107 
This has significant ramifications for how climate adaptation responses (vis-à-vis mitigation) 108 
are governed across geographical space and the role of cities and city-regions in such 109 
territorial governance processes.  110 
 111 
Whereas cities are increasingly seen as leaders on climate adaptation (e.g. through 112 
experimental governance systems), national governments continue to respond to international 113 
competition rather than address growing demands from the urban citizenry for actions to 114 
address climate change (Bulkeley, 2005; Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013; Keohane and 115 
Victor, 2016). Such geopolitical pressures are reflected in transformations in urban 116 
governance. For example, urban politicians and managers today engage in various forms of 117 
‘urban diplomacy’(Phelps and Miao, 2020), effectively enabling their host cities to extend 118 
their influence across international borders and access global networks and flows of 119 
information,  resources, and policy knowledge, including knowledge about successful (and 120 
failed) climate adaptation policies (Frantzeskaki, 2019). For example, almost 100 major cities 121 
currently participate in the United Nations C40 network, which promotes a host of city-scale 122 
actions designed to combat climate change (see https://www.c40.org/cities). In mobilizing 123 
6 
international climate policy networks, cities have seemingly become geopolitical actors in 124 
their own right, circumventing the actions of apparently dysfunctional nation states (Barber, 125 
2013; Johnson, 2018b).  126 
  127 
Recent research has further highlighted the role of ‘experimental’ forms of urban climate 128 
governance in shaping international climate policy (Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013; Hajer 129 
and Versteeg, 2019; Hölscher et al., 2019; Kivimaa et al., 2017). From a policy 130 
implementation perspective, urban experimentation may seem logical given that international 131 
and national policy structures can be unwieldy in preparing for uncertain climate impacts. 132 
However, there is the caveat that we cannot solely rely on the city ‘in silo’ to undo the 133 
failings of national governments and global corporations in terms of their respective 134 
contributions to anthropogenic climate change. Instead, we need to think extra-territorially 135 
when reimagining the role that cities play in governing more just and inclusive climate 136 
futures (Kythreotis, 2018; Wachsmuth, 2017), particularly in the context of how urban 137 
climate decisions can often marginalize local civic voices (Leitner et al., 2018).  138 
 139 
Some suggest that engendering ‘transformational’ adaptation as a form of adaptation 140 
knowledge to improve local adaptive capacity can in fact be circumvented or even ‘hollowed 141 
out’ by upscaling politics (Blythe et al., 2018). However, weakening of the democratic 142 
accountability of governance stakeholders in urban adaptation decisions raises significant 143 
broader questions about the efficacy of urban experimental governance as a transformational 144 
force. This is important for territorial governance more generally because local adaptation 145 
responses to climate change cannot just be solved at the local scale; they requires interaction 146 
between scales for adequate political response to take place (Adger et al., 2005).  147 
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The international scale continues to be the main locus of climate policies designed to 148 
influence how nation states and cities respond to climate policymaking (Bulkeley and Moser, 149 
2007; Purdon, 2015). Nonetheless, exposure to climate risks and impacts has resulted in 150 
national governments paying more policy attention to adaptation  (Pielke Jr et al., 2007). 151 
Adaptation policy, governance and practice is more complex to initiate across different 152 
geographical locations within state territory because it needs to take account of placed-based 153 
forms of knowledge assessment that are socio-politically constructed within a risk-based 154 
framework (Adger, 2009; Adger et al., 2005; Bisaro and Hinkel, 2016; Huitema et al., 2016). 155 
What often results is a vertical ontology of climate policy response, with the international and 156 
national scales respectively constructed as the ‘scale of structure’ (rules, regulations, etc.) and 157 
the local as ‘scale of agency’ (public action, engagement, participation, etc.) (Jonas, 2006; 158 
Marston et al., 2005). There is a need for adaptation responses to move away from the 159 
traditional top-down technical instrumentalism and scalar fixity of international mitigation 160 
policy, to more reflexive responses that are attuned to inter-scalar relations and build greater 161 
resilience to, and even anticipate, uncertain impacts of climate change (Maor et al., 2017). 162 
Recognising a scalar geopolitics of adaptation thus potentially opens up a more 163 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between different adaptation stakeholders vis-à-164 
vis how adaptation knowledge is politically mobilized by state and non-state governance 165 
actors at different spatial scales (Kythreotis et al., 2020). 166 
 167 
2.2. Climate governance and scale 168 
The concept of ‘scale framing’ (Kurtz, 2003) has emerged as a useful way of demonstrating 169 
how different geographical scales are enrolled in urban and regional environmental 170 
movements, governance and policy actions. Ontologically, such scales are neither pre-given 171 
social structures nor directly equivalent to the corresponding state territorial structures (urban 172 
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governments, regions, provinces, etc.). Rather they can emerge through different modes of 173 
social construction that are co-constitutive of producing (an environmental politics of) scale 174 
that may or may not converge around formal state territories (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; 175 
Kythreotis and Jonas, 2012). Kurtz (2003) further suggests that different scales of 176 
environmental governance reflect different degrees of political regulation and cultural 177 
legitimacy on the part of the state; they offer means either to include or exclude actors, often 178 
contributing to environmental injustices rather than promoting progressive transformational 179 
change.  180 
 181 
Arguably, the most widely studied type of scalar relations in the climate governance literature 182 
are top-down vertical relations within the state (Hare et al., 2010). Nonetheless, such ‘vertical 183 
thinking’ tends to obscure knowledge of how climate governance works its way unevenly 184 
through different levels in the scalar hierarchy of climate policymaking  (Bulkeley, 2005; 185 
Kythreotis et al., 2020). Alternatively, climate governance can be understood in terms of 186 
horizontally networked processes stretching across different state territories. For instance, 187 
international and national territorial agreements can be the result of the decisions of 188 
interconnected ‘localities’ (Jessop et al., 2008; Rauken et al., 2014). However, in this case it 189 
is also possible to think of climate governance in terms of polycentricism, in that governance 190 
works simultaneously vertically and horizontally, collectively drawing in a variety of 191 
networked state and non-state actors to tackle climate change (Ostrom, 2009, 2010; Jordan et 192 
al., 2015). In some cases, polycentric governance can create opportunities for non-state actors 193 
to work innovatively within central government policies, but at other times state interference 194 
can block governance innovation (Gillard et al., 2017). The picture is further complicated by 195 
processes of state devolution whereby powers and responsibilities shift between different 196 
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territories (national, regional and local) of the state, opening up further scope for stakeholders 197 
to manoeuvre strategically at different scales (Kythreotis and Jonas, 2012).   198 
 199 
Such differences in the ways in which scholars have approached inter- and intra-state 200 
relations in climate governance suggest that greater attention needs to be paid to mapping and 201 
explaining the diverse ways in which climate actions are geopolitically framed within and 202 
between state territorial structures and scales. When the concept of scaling framing is applied 203 
to these diverse political processes of climate governance, scale becomes not simply a fixed 204 
level in a hierarchy of territories that cascade downwards from the international through the 205 
national to the urban (Bulkeley, 2005). Nor is it solely a horizontal process of policy learning 206 
and knowledge circulation across urban political boundaries. Instead, scales of climate 207 
governance emerge from the politics, policies and governance enacted within and/or between 208 
each scale around and within the state territorial hierarchy (Andonova et al., 2009).  209 
 210 
Framing climate adaptation as a scalar geopolitics potentially offers a more productive way 211 
of representing the complex processes of climate policymaking by highlighting how political 212 
negotiation and contestation occurs around vertical and horizontal interconnected state 213 
structures. Not only do state and non-state actors at the urban scale respond to climate policy 214 
framed at the international scale but also climate actions at the urban scale can influence how 215 
nation states respond to pressures to internationalise state territory and address domestic 216 
challenges of devolution and territorial distribution (Jonas and Moisio, 2018). The remainder 217 
of this section considers the role of urban climate governance in processes of state 218 




2.3 Urban climate governance as scalar geopolitics 222 
The idea that cities function as international climate policy leaders evidently challenges 223 
received assumptions that the Peace of Westphalia (1648) (and subsequent treaties between 224 
rival imperial states) marked the construction of the modern world geopolitical order based 225 
around nation states and that the late twentieth century marked a unidirectional trend towards 226 
the decline of the nation state as the centrepiece of a ‘post-Westphalian’ international 227 
political order (Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl, 2015).  It might be stretching the point to say that 228 
today’s cities have become so detached from nation states that, when it comes to climate 229 
adaptation and other forms of sustainability governance, urban managers behave as 230 
autonomous geopolitical actors. Nonetheless, the growing internationalisation of urban 231 
climate actions requires a fundamental rethinking about the role of cities and, increasingly, 232 
city-regions in the emerging system of international governance. As Dierwechter (2020) 233 
argues, the coming years could well mark the arrival of a ‘green geopolitics’ of urban 234 
development in which cities, states, and global climate politics become closely intertwined.  235 
 236 
This development, in turn, necessitates a more critical understanding of the role of cities in 237 
climate geopolitics, whereby the international competitiveness and resilience of the modern 238 
state is secured not so much by the control of its territory and borders as by its ability to 239 
harness flows of capital and policy knowledge around and through its burgeoning city-240 
regional formations (Moisio, 2018).  Indeed, the convergence of discourses of international 241 
competitiveness and climate change could be contributing to a significant re-territorialisation 242 
of the state around all sorts of newly emergent urban spatial formations (e.g. city-regions) and 243 
their associated climate actions and policy discourses.  244 
 245 
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At the same time, climate adaptation policy opens up opportunities for devolved states to 246 
pursue and promote ‘national’ projects of environmental governance and socio-territorial 247 
redistribution within across their territories, some of which serve to manage growing societal 248 
tensions and environmental injustices within national state borders. We have already noted 249 
that urban politicians and managers engage in various forms of climate diplomacy, which 250 
enable their host cities to reach out far beyond national borders and access global flows of 251 
information, capital, resources, and policy knowledge (cf. Phelps and Miao, 2020). At the 252 
same time, however, the ‘national’ is incorporated into the urban in different geographical 253 
contexts and political projects, ranging from economic development, immigration control, 254 
biosecurity and climate change (Coleman, 2009). Hence the ‘eco-restructuring’ of states and 255 
cities – for example, the search for carbon neutral forms of urban development and territorial 256 
governance (Rice, 2010) –  is a co-constituted yet contested process of state spatial 257 
transformation (While et al., 2010; Jonas et al., 2011; Moisio et al., 2020). 258 
 259 
The necessarily territorialised form of national-state orchestrated politics of climate 260 
adaptation further manifests itself in projects and interventions that bring together 261 
transnational actors, state officials and urban managers, who mobilise international climate 262 
policy through local circuits of knowledge. For example, Evans (2011) illustrates how 263 
adaptive experiments are embedded into urban governance whereby different state and non-264 
state actors (policymakers, businesses, communities and researchers/scientists) work together 265 
within the city as an integrated Social Ecological System (SES). He argues that as a result 266 
“the city is being negotiated as both the site and object of a nascent mode of experimental 267 
governance” (Evans, 2011, p. 224). This suggests, on the one hand, that different urban 268 
experimentations will inevitably produce more reflexive actor-inclusive forms of state- and 269 
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non-state governance that can subvert existing neoliberal logics of mitigation policy 270 
propagated at the international and national scales. 271 
 272 
On the other hand, to the extent that the climate policies of national states are aligning with 273 
those of cities, urban climate adaptation strategies can be deployed in effect as geopolitical 274 
instruments for states and other actors to influence wider (supranational) policy networks. For 275 
example, international climate policy typically frames the climate change issue as an 276 
economic problem of liberal democracy whereby carbon is commodified (Bernstein, 2002). 277 
This framing marginalises any political debate about questions of inter-state and intra-278 
territorial social justice e.g. how nations and cities in the Global North have prospered from 279 
historical GHG emissions, the effects of which are now experienced primarily by nations and 280 
cities in the Global South (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006, 2016; Schipper, 2006). Although 281 
we are witnessing a civil backlash in the form of the ‘new civil politics of climate change’  282 
(Kythreotis and Mercer, n.d., forthcoming) (e.g. Extinction Rebellion mass protests and the 283 
School for Strikes movement), these new urban social and environmental movements have 284 
accelerated the search by national governments for policy actions that are designed to make 285 
cities and local communities more resilient and less vulnerable to climate impacts.  286 
 287 
Moreover, urban climate governance has become quite integral to efforts by nation states to 288 
negotiate with, and potentially appease, rival competition states via international climate 289 
negotiations. Take, for example, debates about climate transformation. The 290 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Summary for Policymakers (SPM) for 291 
Working Group II has defined transformation as “a change in the fundamental attributes of 292 
natural and human systems… transformation could reflect strengthened, altered, or aligned 293 
paradigms, goals, or values towards promoting adaptation for sustainable development, 294 
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including poverty reduction” (IPCC, 2014a, p. 5). In approaching transformation from a 295 
systems perspective (natural and human), the IPCC definition opens up an ‘opportunity 296 
space’ for nation states to mobilise urban climate governance and enable climate resilient 297 
territorial development pathways through ‘iterative learning, deliberative process and 298 
innovation’(IPCC, 2014a, p.29). Such systems thinking is further evidence of how urban 299 
climate policy enters into the national and international policy arena, serving to make climate 300 
change more palatable and, in the process, shaping scalar geopolitical practices (Bulkeley and 301 
Betsill, 2005; cf. Bulkeley, 2005).  302 
 303 
III METHODS  304 
To investigate the unfolding scalar politics of climate governance in the UK, twenty-eight 305 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with adaptation stakeholders across UK city-306 
regions from 2014-2017. These city-regions were chosen because they are located in different 307 
devolved administrations of the UK (excluding Northern Ireland). They include Cardiff 308 
(Wales), Glasgow and Edinburgh (Scotland), and Leeds, York, Hull and London (England). 309 
Getting cross-sectional responses from the devolved UK territories was important because 310 
England, Scotland and Wales have approached adaptation policy in slightly different ways, 311 
notwithstanding central UK legislation through the Climate Change Act (2008). Such 312 
legislation requires a UK policy framework for national risk assessments every five years, a 313 
UK Committee on Climate Change (which comprises an adaptation sub-committee), the 314 
National Adaptation Programme (NAP) and the UK Adaptation Reporting Power (Committee 315 
on Climate Change, 2017). At the time, other legally non-binding policy initiatives were also 316 
established by the Department of Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) through 317 
the Environment Agency (EA) to deal with climate impacts. For example, Climate Ready and 318 
Climate Local were designed to assist businesses, communities and local government to 319 
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jointly deal with climate impacts like flooding. These initiatives have since been closed down 320 
(Salvidge, 2016). A Local Adaptation Advisory Panel (LAAP) was also established in late 321 
2010 by DEFRA to ensure the views of local councils in England were congruent with 322 
nationally established policies on adaptation. Additionally, DEFRA and the EA part-funded 323 
‘Climate UK’ in 2011, a network of state and non-state organisations supporting climate 324 
action across the UK in all devolved territories. 325 
 326 
Hence, given how climate adaptation policy is discursively shaped by the different territorial 327 
configurations of the UK state, we specifically wanted to examine how the broader 328 
governance of climate adaptation, that is, how state and non-state actors have worked 329 
together in promoting climate adaptation across different state spatial configurations as a 330 
means to more closely examine the nuances of contemporary scalar climate geopolitics. It has 331 
been argued, for instance, that successful adaptation strategies require distinct horizontal and 332 
vertical multi-scalar governance responses by a variety of stakeholders, such that adaptation 333 
policy influence is not solely attributed as being ‘state-led’ (Adger et al., 2005; Boyd and 334 
Juhola, 2015).  335 
 336 
Interviewees were chosen using a snowball technique, which allowed the researcher to use 337 
the interviewees in developing the entire research network, rather than randomly interviewing 338 
subjects (Valentine, 2005). Interviewees were drawn from environmental consultants, public 339 
and third sector officials working at both urban and national scales. The interviews took the 340 
form of a semi-structured interview which enabled the interviewer to focus on conceptual 341 
themes related to the subject matter of the research, but to also explore nuances which allows 342 
the interview to “take a conversational, fluid form, [with] each interview varying according to 343 
the interests, experiences and views of the interviewee” (Valentine, 2005, p.111). This is 344 
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particularly pertinent with respect to empirically establishing how adaptation policy and 345 
governance has a fundamentally temporal lens (i.e. long-term change and transformation) 346 
(e.g. see Cook, 2018) but also can incorporate the nuances of seeing adaptation policy 347 
through the lens of stakeholders experiencing processes of territorial devolution. Hence, the 348 
interview guide consisted of a number of broad themes related to climate adaptation, its 349 
governance and policy, and geographical scale. These included individual and organization, 350 
funding, climate adaptation definitions and policies, climate transformation definitions and 351 
policies, urban, national (UK and its devolved territories) and international (scalar) responses 352 
and tensions surrounding climate adaptation, the role of adaptation knowledge mobilisation, 353 
the nature of stakeholder relationships (governance) and changes, challenges and the future. 354 
 355 
These semi-structured interviews were transcribed into Word documents and then analysed to 356 
find emerging adaptation governance nuances derived from the broader themes cited above, 357 
specifically around the scalar politics of climate adaptation. The grounded theory approach to 358 
analysing the interview data was used after Corbin & Strauss (2008). That is the transcribed 359 
documents were coded into nodes, and then conceptualized into more distinct groups and 360 
categorized to derive particular themes that related to the initial broader themes of the semi-361 
structured interview brief. The grounded theory method is more empirically exploratory 362 
rather than deductively fitting the data into any existing theory or preconceived data patterns 363 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002), enabling the development of a broader picture of how climate 364 
adaptation governance (knowledge and policy) in the UK captures a scalar geopolitics built 365 
around international, national and local/urban framings and knowledges of climate change. 366 
 367 
 Additionally, at the time when interviews commenced, adaptation was intuitively seen as a 368 
national policy field in its own right (Massey and Huitema, 2012) and, as devolution has 369 
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progressed, the UK was witnessing a more reflexive bottom-up governance between different 370 
state and non-state actors – ‘leaders and pioneers’(Wurzel et al., 2019) – often emanating in 371 
cities coalescing around the low carbon mitigation agenda in the absence of strong 372 
hierarchical mechanisms of the national state (Torney, 2019). Through the interview format 373 
described above, we also expected to find new emergent forms of reflexive and co-productive 374 
adaptation governance forming at and across different scales. In this sense, our findings 375 
prompted us to suggest that urban and state internationalisation on climate policy and 376 
governance are becoming more closely aligned even though urban and national spaces of 377 
climate adaptation governance in the UK continue to be colonized by contradictory policy 378 
discourses relating in part to contested knowledges and understandings of devolution as much 379 
as those pertaining to climate change. 380 
 381 
IV CITIES AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UK  382 
Drawing upon the research interview findings, this section explores three dimensions of the 383 
scalar geopolitics of climate adaptation governance in the UK: (1) urban climate governance 384 
and the internationalisation of the state; (2) climate governance and the ‘national’ question; 385 
and (3) local climate policy knowledge and tensions between the urban and national scales. 386 
 387 
4.1 Urban climate governance and the internationalisation of the UK state 388 
The first theme from the interview research concerns how climate governance at the urban 389 
(sub-national) scale is enrolled in the UK state’s efforts to internationalise climate policy and 390 
governance. This is significant because it has been argued that key empirical challenges 391 
include the need to assess how urban climate governance has had a global impact and 392 
whether cities have been effective in plugging the gap between action and policy rhetoric 393 
created by national state inaction  (van der Heijden, 2019; Wolfram et al., 2019).  We find 394 
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evidence of an ongoing scalar tension that can act to delimit bottom-up climate governance – 395 
contra the urban governance literature – whereby adaptation policy practice is structurally 396 
dependent on how adaptation knowledge is politically mobilized at different scales of climate 397 
governance, and in particular at the national and international scales, where science and 398 
policy knowledge discourses on climate change, particularly resilience, have been 399 
institutionalized (Göpfert et al., 2019; Johnson, 2018c; Kythreotis, 2018; Menkes and 400 
Menkes, 2010; Purdon, 2015). 401 
 402 
The IPCC has been the key international institution responsible for reviewing the latest 403 
climate research and therefore holds significant sway in policy neutral advice. Although not 404 
conducting any research itself, the IPCC does provide Summary for Policymakers (SPM) 405 
reports, and many of our interviewees looked to global science-policy platforms for the 406 
evidence-base to inform local policy decisions. For example, Interviewee 1 claimed how 407 
“Adaptation is that kind of classical, but ‘all encompassing’ IPCC definition around, it is a 408 
description of the change that we are facing and the challenge of adapting to that.” 409 
Interviewee 2 argued, “I think the IPCC reports, the increasing fact it is used by the 410 
Government on climate adaptation, climate change helps the debate and makes it easier for 411 
us because it is there…in  front of people’s minds and that helps”. Similarly, the importance 412 
of the IPCC revolves around an established evidence-base to inform local decisions, as 413 
Interviewee 3 argued, “But we need to try and steer people into the fence and the evidence... I 414 
think what was interesting for me was the evidence that came out from the IPCC you know on 415 
that some of the climate sides… and that was the warning from the IPCC wasn't it?” 416 
 417 
IPCC reports have been written to be policy relevant and neutral rather than policy 418 
prescriptive, so that policymakers can use the latest science to initiate policy via the 419 
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traditional linear model of expertise where truth speaks to power (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; 420 
Bolin, 2007). Hence, the way in which the science (and what types of knowledge discourses 421 
these take) is framed by the IPCC has important effects on other geopolitical issues, such as 422 
conflict and security (Gleditsch and Nordås, 2014). How national politicians ‘scientize the 423 
politics’ (e.g. US President Trump’s Tweets), or how scientists ‘politicize the science’ by 424 
speaking politically about climate change when their role is simply to study climate change as 425 
an ‘objective’ science based on observation (Forsyth, 2012), have important feedbacks into 426 
the way that society culturally represents and responds to such knowledge discourses, e.g. 427 
through media representations (Boykoff, 2008). Such representations highlight how 428 
international geopolitical framing of climate change and their dominant science-policy 429 
rationalities can influence pathways of adaptation response at the urban/local scale in more 430 
discursively managed ways (Grove, 2016, 2014). Similarly, Johnson (2018b) has argued how 431 
urban adaptation politics is often contradicted by national and international climate 432 
discourses even though the policy intention is to make internationally framed science 433 
discourses congruent with urban policy responses to climate risks. For example, Interviewee 434 
4, in discussing the connection between IPCC-framed science and local policy action argued,   435 
 436 
“There is a need to remove the kind of mystique and the disconnect between the 437 
science community and the policy community so it’s a two-way process.  I think 438 
researchers in order to change the world, you know people with scientific insights 439 
that are important to bring to society, they need to be able to understand how best to 440 
do that and that’s the sort of stuff that we are in a very tiny way…” 441 
 442 
The geopolitical reframing of urban climate governance by the nation state further resonates 443 
with the idea that the climate science-policy process at the international scale is itself rigidly 444 
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‘framed’ by pre-given assumptions about objectiveness and political neutrality, which can be 445 
broadly indifferent to urban decision-making processes. Interviewee 5 argued, “Policy should 446 
reflect the local needs, local activities.  I’m less keen on policies taken at an international 447 
stage… so I think for me the idea of policy around climate change and climate change 448 
adaptation would be best delivered by a balance of the realities of what it’s like on the 449 
ground.” This also resonates with the idea that (urban) transformation has a ‘heuristic, 450 
subjective and relative character’ (Rickards and Howden, 2012, 242) that on the face of it, 451 
may not conform to internationally-framed science-policy institutionalism. In this sense, the 452 
internationalisation of climate change within the UK state conversely makes urban adaptation 453 
action contingent upon how different forms of climate knowledge are managed, mobilized 454 
and articulated ‘upscale’ in more formal institutionalized science-policy spaces.  455 
 456 
Another example of the contradictory process of the internationalisation of the UK state in 457 
urban adaptation action is related to how international framings are ostensibly dominated by 458 
the climate mitigation science-policy framing. We have discussed this briefly in the 459 
introduction and section 2.1, and our interviewees also highlighted how this was a problem 460 
for implementing new forms of urban adaptation actions. For example, Interviewee 6 461 
discussed the issue of mitigation dominating national climate policy discourse that affects 462 
urban adaptation: 463 
 464 
“So, there’s an argument that they should play the role in thinking about how those 465 
risks may change in the future. But that’s not really happening… and yes, I think 466 
there isn’t enough of a link, policy join up between adaptation and mitigation.  And I 467 
think you could even argue that that’s partly a reflection of the Act, the Climate 468 
Change Act where adaptation is a bit of an add on.”  469 
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 470 
This was also reflected upon by Interviewee 7, who highlighted the scalar tensions of 471 
mitigation and adaptation policymaking:  472 
 473 
“Mitigation is slightly different because national policy on mitigation is fairly easily 474 
to tweak at local level but the adaptation stuff is very rigid in terms of how its 475 
monitored and I find it a real struggle when you’re talking to people about it and 476 
you’re like well we are actually talking about the agriculture bits of how it cross 477 
merges. And I think that’s always going to be a challenge when adaptation policy is 478 
written at national level is that every geographical area is completely different.” 479 
 480 
The reason for the emphasis on mitigation, argued Interviewee 8, was purely economic, 481 
reflecting the internationalisation of the UK state in climate policy implementation:  482 
 483 
“There’s still very much a focus particularly in tough economic times on mitigation 484 
because you can see that you’re going to save money on mitigation.  You know it’s a 485 
no brainer.  You’re going to reduce your emissions…  So, they can see that at the 486 
start they want to do that.  Things like renewables, that is suddenly flavour of the 487 
month because again it’s mitigation and not adaptation… But other things for 488 
adaptation it’s difficult to quantify what you’re going to say because it might not be 489 
saving money.” 490 
 491 
National and international scales, therefore, remain in the very least a significant structural 492 
causal factor that can shape not only how adaptation is politically governed at the urban scale. 493 
Moreover, urban climate governance itself is internationalised through the actions of the 494 
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nation state in the way that it dominantly frames climate change through a low carbon 495 
mitigation rhetoric that is economically incentivised. 496 
 497 
4.2 Climate change and the ‘national’ question in the UK 498 
In our interviews, we further found that state-led institutionalized policy processes have 499 
considerable power to frame the climate geopolitical debate around different interpretations 500 
of the ‘national’, specifically in how adaptation decisions are made within a UK devolved 501 
political context.  502 
 503 
Since 2008, the statutory framework for climate change in the UK has been heralded as 504 
something of a world leader in adaptation policy circles  (Biesbroek et al., 2010; Massey and 505 
Huitema, 2012). Hence, we expected to see the different devolved UK territories promoting 506 
adaptation governance that could challenge existing policy systems, norms and paradigms in 507 
unexpected ways  (Nelson et al., 2007; O’Brien, 2012). For example, Wales and Scotland 508 
have additional legislative requirements for climate adaptation. The Climate Change 509 
(Scotland) Act of 2009 requires all public bodies (including local authorities) in Scotland to 510 
report on adaptation if required by Scottish Ministers. Similarly, in Wales, the 2015 Well-511 
Being of Future Generations Act (WFGA) requires local authorities to take the lead on long-512 
term sustainability and adaptation issues through Public Service Boards (PSBs). PSBs are 513 
scrutinized by a Future Generations Commissioner (FGC) who has the power to review how 514 
PSBs approach local well-being and adaptation, and if something does go wrong, the PSB has 515 
a duty to take all reasonable steps to follow the course of action recommended by the FGC. 516 
Hence, the essence of the WFGA is to challenge the idea that adaptation responses will 517 
always be reactive by joining-up cities and communities with government, specifically local 518 
authorities, and related public agencies to autonomously and anticipatorily plan for climate 519 
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impacts in a bottom-up way. So, we certainly expected new forms of reflexive governance to 520 
be emerging out of such a unique piece of legislation especially from our interviews in 521 
Wales. 522 
 523 
However, we found that the political context of UK devolution attributed urban actors to 524 
appease national state (central) adaptation policy when more transformational pathways of 525 
adaptation response threatened to emerge. Interviewee 2 clarified how national adaptation 526 
policy (e.g. National Adaptation Programme) was supposed to seamlessly link with local 527 
authority adaptation actions: 528 
 529 
“We wrote the Local Authority chapter, part of the National Adaptation Programme 530 
or advised, there should be an adaptation, a Local Authority chapter and there should 531 
be within the programme, pointing to all the actions of Local Authorities…” 532 
 533 
Hence, there was intention of mainstreaming adaptation between discrete policy scales. 534 
However, interviewee 9 spoke of their relationship with DEFRA over how different forms of 535 
policy knowledge were transferred between DEFRA and the EA: 536 
 537 
“[M]ore nationally, the EA is working with DEFRA… to shape what the National 538 
Adaptation Programme looks like… So, DEFRA will informally seek our views… on 539 
certain policy areas.  They certainly do on climate change and, likewise, the EA will 540 
respond to a consultation...   that kind of two-way flow, but I think there is definitely a 541 




The above quotes suggest formal and non-formal mechanisms were embedded vertically and 545 
horizontally within the state to ensure climate adaptation policy implementation. However, 546 
such adaptation policy decisions were usually reduced to the economics of adaptation and 547 
resource budgets. As the interviewee 9 continued: 548 
 549 
“We [EA] are a government funded organisation, [and] our task is delivering the 550 
policy government sets us. [T]here are severe challenges in how we do it… A lot of 551 
it’s tied up in high level conversations around policy and the amount of funding we 552 
get and what we can and can’t do… we are encouraged… to actually deliver as much 553 
as we can for every pound…” 554 
 555 
This also illustrates how economic austerity figures quite highly in adaptation decisions that 556 
cascade down from higher to local policy scales (Porter et al., 2015). Similarly, interviewee 557 
10 commented: 558 
  559 
“If your central nervous system of the economy fails … it’s a pretty bad situation to 560 
be in… the other longer-term aspects of adaptation, adaptation to the built 561 
environment and green spaces… get side-lined in favour of it.” 562 
 563 
This economic driver for adaptation decisions was also surprisingly reflected by interviews in 564 
Wales where the legislatively ‘ground-breaking’ WFGA had already come into force. 565 
Interviewee 11, a climate consultant who historically worked closely with Welsh Government 566 
on promoting local climate adaptation in communities argued: 567 
  568 
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“There should be clear directive from Welsh Government to local government and 569 
local service boards and via the Future Generations Bill [WFGA]… I don't think it's 570 
seen as a kind of priority issue by Welsh Government.  That's reflected in the 571 
guidance and money that's given to local government.  There are no carrots and 572 
there's no sticks.  No power.” 573 
 574 
Other interviewees working in England also highlighted how institutional structures designed 575 
to link local, regional and national adaptation policy and action were weakened under 576 
changes of UK government moving from regional assemblies and regional development 577 
agencies under New Labour to a more centralised national policy agenda on climate change 578 
under the Conservative administration. Interviewee 12, an environmental consultant from the 579 
Yorkshire and Humber region argued: 580 
 581 
2I think the LEP has… the regional players at a high level … but there isn’t really a 582 
mirror group underneath that… that’s where the LEPs came about… you had 583 
national indicators there and… local authorities doing a baseline then working your 584 
way up through a full stage process to incorporate adaptation into the local authority 585 
work and into local communities.  When the change of government came about … the 586 
public sector has really been drifting… there isn’t really anything that’s guiding or 587 
shaping local authorities or local communities in a particular direction of 588 
adaptation.” 589 
 590 
Interviewee 2 also highlighted how institutional voids were created between policy scales 591 
when there was a change of UK national government, hindering practical adaptation between 592 
scales: 593 
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“[I]t’s that void between the local office and the national office now we’ve got rid of 594 
the regional offices. Yet we still have strategic managers from the EA meeting LA 595 
strategic managers but there doesn’t seem to be that continuity between what the 596 
officers are doing on the ground and what the vision is of all these organisations 597 
working together. At an operational level, we’re very proactive in engaging with each 598 
other and sharing information.” 599 
 600 
Such hollowing out of territorial government spaces in England, whilst working within a 601 
devolved UK context, has created certain continuity issues that has made adaptation 602 
governance roles opaque and messy, despite attempts to be proactive in seizing opportunities 603 
to engage with other actors. However, the nature of scalar relations with respect to adaptation 604 
governance was more nuanced in Scotland as compared to England and Wales. Interviewee 605 
13, a city council officer working in Glasgow explained: 606 
 607 
“I feel we are already a step ahead with the climate change adaptation programme by 608 
Scottish Government, it seems to echo a lot of what we have already done in terms of 609 
Climate Ready Clyde… we will take a regional approach, rather than cities consider 610 
themselves as a silo approach to look at impacts potentially where you can make 611 
inroads.” 612 
 613 
Also, another Glasgow city council policy officer, interviewee 14, expressed the importance 614 
of devolved Scotland over central UK guidance with respect to adaptation policy: 615 
  616 
“[Adaptation] consultation will be managed through the Scottish Government, rather 617 
than us [city] directly linking into DEFRA for instance, that is more likely to be the 618 
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case… that we will see the civil servants from Edinburgh, who will have dealt with the 619 
civil servants from Westminster as it were.” 620 
 621 
These interview findings suggest the way in which adaptation decisions were made in vertical 622 
and horizontal relations within the UK state were through a nationally-orientated climate 623 
politics governed by economic framings, budgets and costs. Yet Scotland was slightly 624 
different to England and Wales in that the nature of this national politics coalesced within the 625 
Scottish territory, rather than any articulation between UK central government and devolved 626 
government in Edinburgh. In England and Wales, UK central government was able to 627 
strategically-steer devolved adaptation decision-making. These interviews certainly highlight 628 
the integral role of national politics in framing urban adaptation responses. The next section 629 
builds on this section by discussing the ways in which national and urban spaces of climate 630 
adaptation governance in the UK are in tension through the colonisation of contradictory 631 
policy and governance discourses. 632 
 633 
4.3 The contradictory discourses of urban and national climate adaptation governance and 634 
policy 635 
Our third finding concerns how national and urban spaces of climate adaptation governance 636 
and policy in the UK are being colonized by contradictory discourses, and how this is 637 
reflected in the local circulation of climate knowledges. Having already established the 638 
complex, unevenly distributed and cross-cutting scalar politics of adaptation (Boyd and 639 
Juhola, 2015; Nightingale, 2017; Rauken et al., 2014; Urwin and Jordan, 2008), measuring 640 
the effectiveness of urban and local adaptation governance is problematic given that such 641 
polycentric governance can be well-removed from top-down international policy fixity 642 
(Abbott, 2012; Ostrom, 2010; Jordan et al., 2015). Thus the heuristic potential to use 643 
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knowledge of scalar politics to articulate more effective climate adaptation governance is 644 
central to future innovation and transformation being discursively framed at the urban scale 645 
(Haarstad, 2014; Amundsen et al., 2010).   646 
 647 
Bulkeley et al. (2013) have argued how urban climate experiments represent a socio-technical 648 
response to how climate mitigation and adaptation are being configured and contested. They 649 
continue by arguing that such experiments unfold in the most unlikely of places having 650 
unseen and unexpected political repercussions within wider urban transition processes and 651 
move beyond, and even enervate more formally structured, institutionalized ways of climate 652 
adaptation policymaking. Grove (2016) has shown how formal insurance schemes designed 653 
to mitigate climate disaster and risk and promote greater local adaptive capacity are in fact 654 
reconfigured through certain governance and power rationalities that perpetuate the global 655 
logic of financial capital accumulation. Oosterlynck & González (2013) have also shown how 656 
experimental urban governance represents a re-assemblage of existing international and 657 
national neoliberal discourses. This complements other work that sees climate change 658 
governance politically mobilized as a neoliberal discursive action  (Braun, 2014; 659 
Swyngedouw, 2013, 2010, 2007). 660 
 661 
The results of our interviews suggest that downscale pressures trumped bottom-up 662 
transformations in urban adaptation governance. We find little evidence of cities and local 663 
communities having increased autonomy in local adaptation governance decisions. However, 664 
we found pockets of governance actions by some local stakeholders that took advantage of 665 
the existing policy system, trying to work within pre-defined parameters of state policy 666 
structures on adaptation. Here local trust (and, by implication, distrust) between political 667 
scales and state territories was a constant theme that emerged in many interviews. For 668 
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example, interviewee 15 from Climate UK talked of seizing ‘opportunity’ and being 669 
‘pragmatic’ by knowing how ‘to talk to national politicians in a certain way to get what you 670 
want’ and ‘developing trust to initiate change’. Another interviewee (12) was quick to point 671 
out embedded issues of trust between different government agencies operating at different 672 
scales: 673 
 674 
“At a local level there is a general distrust of LAs… they don’t really know best.  675 
There’s a distrust of people like the EA… the way they generate decisions because 676 
they are not right for that person living in one of those houses that hasn’t been 677 
prioritised by the EA who got flooded…  I think flipping that the other way in terms of 678 
power, LAs, there is an element of that in terms of what we can do, and we can’t do, 679 
engaging with communities… There’s a lot of posturing going on and a lot of distrust 680 
between the unitary authorities in between the LEP and the government there’s an 681 
element of distrust into the motives.” 682 
 683 
So, if there is distrust within government, how would one expect more transformational 684 
governance responses to climate adaptation to emerge through social contracts between state 685 
and non-state governance actors, let alone reflexive, autonomous bottom-up responses from 686 
local communities? Interviewee, who worked closely with local Scottish communities 687 
reflected on this, viewing adaptation action as being congruent with having empathy with 688 
different socially-situated contexts: 689 
 690 
“I think adaptation action is having empathy and understanding, the starting point 691 
that people are important… acknowledging that we don’t have all of the answers, so 692 
actually we don’t need more adaptation experts. We need people who are experts in 693 
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different sectors and fields to learn about adaptation and apply that knowledge in 694 
their own sectors… that is really important. So, some of the really good work that has 695 
happened through planning is because people from different organisations and areas 696 
of expertise have come and really engaged on adaptation and then applied it in their 697 
context in quite transformational ways.” 698 
 699 
This suggests that ideas of transformation in local adaptation governance are enacted and 700 
reconstituted in less obvious, but nevertheless, more reflexive and innovative ways within 701 
state-led adaptation policy structures; albeit this occurs in highly contradictory and often 702 
contested ways across UK devolved territories. Trust plays a key role in establishing new 703 
urban pathways to adaptation, but nevertheless such pathways are interjected by the 704 
discursive alignment of the ‘urban’ and the ‘national’ through mitigation policy discourses 705 
that infiltrate state internationalisation of climate policy.  706 
 707 
V CONCLUSION 708 
Our argument in this paper is that the participation of cities in climate governance introduces 709 
a complex scalar geopolitics shaping climate adaptation that is contingent on the type(s) of 710 
knowledge networks and governance relationships operating at the international, national and 711 
urban scales. Rather than cities being detached from nation states, cities and nation states 712 
have become closely intertwined in climate governance processes. Sometimes, cities lobby 713 
international climate networks such as the C40 and IPPC; at other times, nation states use 714 
urban climate policy to negotiate with, and appease, their geopolitical competitors; on still 715 
other occasions, climate policy is enrolled in efforts by the state to manage domestic political 716 
problems, not least contested processes of devolution. As Dierwechter (2020, 399) argues, 717 
“Cities, states and global environmental politics are ‘co-shaping’ each other, producing a 718 
30 
global variety of green (and other kinds of) geopolitics”. How better to understand these 719 
‘green’ geopolitical processes likely represents a major new research agenda in comparative 720 
approaches to territory, politics and governance in the coming years. 721 
 722 
The findings of this paper also bear upon the point that Dalby (2013a) makes in his analysis 723 
of Kahn (Kahn, 2013) in that engendering a more effective climate change geopolitics is 724 
about much more than the role of national states, even though such states hold 725 
disproportionate amounts of power in shaping international climate geopolitics (Kythreotis, 726 
2012). Rather, climate geopolitics should be about so much more than dominant mitigation 727 
policy framings that straddle national and international scales. It is wholly a political issue of 728 
how it is represented at other scales, too, especially the urban and regional scales and their 729 
respective (devolved) state territories (Dalby, 2016). Viewing climate geopolitics through a 730 
scalar lens refocuses how climate adaptation territorial governance responses might be more 731 
successful. The urban and regional scales are where the nuts-and-bolts of climate governance 732 
and policy are structurally (state-led policy) and/or reflexively (state and non-state 733 
governance) played out. Hence, we argue that the climate adaptation territorial governance 734 
debate should refocus its epistemological gaze on the links and interconnections between the 735 
international, national and urban (city-region) scales as a means to reinforce the politics of 736 
adaptation as a geopolitics of scale in which the future of cities is increasingly implicated.  737 
 738 
In reinforcing the politics of adaptation as a geopolitics of scale, this paper has further 739 
highlighted the nature of interconnections between otherwise missing scales of analysis in the 740 
climate geopolitics debate: (i) the increasing discursive alignment of the ‘urban’ and the 741 
‘national’ in international climate adaptation policy and decision-making processes; and (ii) 742 
the contradictions between urban and national climate policy discourses across the UK 743 
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devolved territories. Through interviews with a range of adaptation stakeholders working 744 
across the UK and its devolved territories of Scotland, Wales and England, we have shown 745 
how some actors strategically used local deliberative processes as an ‘opportunity space’ for 746 
governance, as framed by the IPCC (2014c, 29). Yet reconstitution of adaptation being 747 
approached in more amorphous ways by our interviewees e.g. trust/distrust, pragmatism, 748 
empathy, also highlights how the practical cross-cutting nature of climate governance – its 749 
scalar geopolitics – poses problems for the institutional make-up and decision-making 750 
processes of territorial governance, resulting in a lack of ‘fit’ between the nature of the 751 
problem to be governed and the institutions undertaking that governance (Betsill and 752 
Bulkeley, 2007; Lawrence et al., 2015). 753 
  754 
All of this leads us to question the notion of whether the urban scale is at all autonomous in 755 
governing appropriate (and transformational) climate adaptation responses. Rather, cities and, 756 
increasingly, city-regions are part of a messy territorial governance system that at best, 757 
provides a limited ‘opportunity space’ for quasi-autonomous intervention by certain actors 758 
within pre-defined national state policy structures, e.g. the UK National Adaptation 759 
Programme. We find that current adaptation governance processes operating at the urban 760 
scale in a devolved UK state are more than simply an extension of the ‘collective’ national 761 
politics that go on through the internationalisation of the state via the mitigation policy 762 
imperative, although they are certainly deeply influenced by them as or interviews illustrate. 763 
They also go to the heart of the problematic ‘national’ question operating within the devolved 764 
UK state. These empirical findings suggest that the climate geopolitics debate needs to more 765 
fully analyse and incorporate the contradictory nature of how adaptation knowledge is 766 
mobilized at different scales of territorial climate governance in order to fully expose how 767 
urban adaptation is fully played out as a more equitable and just geopolitics of scale. 768 
32 
REFERENCES 769 
Abbott, K.W. (2012) The transnational regime complex for climate change. Environment and 770 
Planning C: Government and Policy, 30(4) 571–590. 771 
Adger, W. (2009) Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate Change. 772 
Economic Geography, 79(4) 387–404. Available from 773 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1944-8287.2003.tb00220.x [accessed 11 July 2018]. 774 
Adger, W., Arnell, N.W. and Tompkins, E.L. (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change 775 
across scales. Global Environmental Change, 15(2) 77–86. Available from 776 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378004000901. 777 
Adger, W., Dessai, S., Goulden, M., Hulme, M., Lorenzoni, I., Nelson, D.R., Naess, L.O., 778 
Wolf, J. and Wreford, A. (2009) Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? 779 
Climatic Change, 93(93) 335–354. Available from 780 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10584-008-9520-z [accessed 27 August 2016]. 781 
Amundsen, H., Berglund, F. and Westskog, H. (2010) Overcoming barriers to climate change 782 
adaptation - a question of multilevel governance? Environment and Planning C: 783 
Government and Policy, 28(2) 276–289. 784 
Andonova, L.B., Betsill, M.M. and Bulkeley, H. (2009) Transnational climate governance. 785 
Global Environmental Politics, 9(2) 52–73. 786 
Bäckstrand, K. and Lövbrand, E. (2006) Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change: 787 
Contested Discourses of Ecological Modernization, Green Governmentality and Civic 788 
Environmentalism. Global Environmental Politics, 6(1) 50–75. Available from 789 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/glep.2006.6.1.50 [accessed 24 April 790 
2016]. 791 
Bäckstrand, K. and Lövbrand, E. (2016) The Road to Paris: Contending Climate Governance 792 
Discourses in the Post-Copenhagen Era. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, 793 
33 
8 March, 1–19 Available from 794 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1523908X.2016.1150777 [accessed 31 795 
March 2018]. 796 
Barber, B. (2013) If Mayors Rules the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities. New 797 
Haven: Yale University Press. 798 
Benzie, M. (2014) Social Justice and Adaptation in the UK. Ecology and Society, 19(1) art39. 799 
Available from http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss1/art39/ [accessed 28 May 800 
2018]. 801 
Bernstein, S. (2002) Liberal Environmentalism and Global Environmental Governance. 802 
Global Environmental Politics, 2(3) 1–16. Available from 803 
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doix/abs/10.1162/152638002320310509 [accessed 13 804 
July 2020]. 805 
Betsill, M. and Bulkeley, H. (2007) Looking Back and Thinking Ahead: A Decade of Cities 806 
and Climate Change Research. Local Environment, 12(5) 447–456. 807 
Biesbroek, G.R., Swart, R.J., Carter, T.R., Cowan, C., Henrichs, T., Mela, H., Morecroft, 808 
M.D. and Rey, D. (2010) Europe adapts to climate change: Comparing National 809 
Adaptation Strategies. Global Environmental Change, 20(3) 440–450. Available from 810 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378010000269. 811 
Bisaro, A. and Hinkel, J. (2016) Governance of social dilemmas in climate change 812 
adaptation. Nature Climate Change, 6(4) 354–359. Available from 813 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2936 [accessed 24 March 2016]. 814 
Blythe, J., Silver, J., Evans, L., Armitage, D., Bennett, N.J., Moore, M.-L., Morrison, T.H. 815 
and Brown, K. (2018) The Dark Side of Transformation: Latent Risks in Contemporary 816 
Sustainability Discourse. Antipode, 50(5) 1206–1223. Available from 817 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/anti.12405 [accessed 15 July 2020]. 818 
34 
Bolin, B. (2007) A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change: The Role of the 819 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 820 
Boyd, E. and Juhola, S. (2015) Adaptive climate change governance for urban resilience. 821 
Urban Studies, 52(7) 1234–1264. Available from 822 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0042098014527483 [accessed 13 July 2020]. 823 
Boykoff, M. (2008) The cultural politics of climate change discourse in UK tabloids. 824 
Political Geography, 27(5) 549–569. 825 
Braun, B.P. (2014) A New Urban Dispositif? Governing Life in an Age of Climate Change. 826 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 32(1) 49–64. 827 
Bulkeley, H. (2013) Cities and climate change. Routledge. 828 
Bulkeley, H. (2005) Reconfiguring environmental governance: Towards a politics of scales 829 
and networks. Political Geography, 24(8) 875–902. 830 
Bulkeley, H. and Betsill, M. (2005) Rethinking Sustainable Cities: Multilevel Governance 831 
and the ‘Urban’ Politics of Climate Change. Environmental Politics, 14(1) 42–63. 832 
Available from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0964401042000310178 833 
[accessed 17 July 2016]. 834 
Bulkeley, H. and Castán Broto, V. (2013) Government by experiment? Global cities and the 835 
governing of climate change. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 38(3) 836 
361–375. Available from https://rgs-837 
ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00535.x [accessed 13 838 
July 2020]. 839 
Bulkeley, H., Castán Broto, V. and Maassen, A. (2014) Low-carbon Transitions and the 840 
Reconfiguration of Urban Infrastructure. Urban Studies, 51(7) 1471–1486. Available 841 
from http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0042098013500089 [accessed 11 July 842 
2018]. 843 
35 
Bulkeley, H. and Moser, S.C. (2007) Responding to Climate Change: Governance and Social 844 
Action beyond Kyoto. Global Environmental Politics, 7(2) 1–10. Available from 845 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/glep.2007.7.2.1#.VxT6J_krK1s 846 
[accessed 18 April 2016]. 847 
Coleman, M. (2009) What counts as the politics and practice of security, and where? 848 
devolution and immigrant insecurity after 9/11. Annals of the Association of American 849 
Geographers, 99(5) 904–913. Available from 850 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00045600903245888 [accessed 13 July 851 
2020]. 852 
Committee on Climate Change (2017) UK adaptation policy – Committee on Climate 853 
Change. 854 
Cook, J. (2018) Imagining Futures: Using Semi-Structured Interviews to Study Long-Term 855 
Thinking. SAGE Publications Ltd. 856 
Corbin, J. and Strauss, A. (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures 857 
for Developing Grounded Theory. 3rd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 858 
Dalby, S. (2019) Bordering sustainability in the Anthropocene. Territory, Politics, 859 
Governance, 1–17. 860 
Dalby, S. (2013a) Geopolitics in the anthropocene: A reply to Clark, Kahn and Lehman. 861 
Political Geography 37 p.56–57. 862 
Dalby, S. (2016) Political geography and climate change. Introduction to a virtual special 863 
issue of Political Geography on climate change and political geography, November 864 
2015-February 2016. Political Geography, 50 71–73. 865 
Dalby, S. (2013b) The geopolitics of climate change. Political Geography, 37 38–47. 866 
Delaney, D. and Leitner, H. (1997) The political construction of scale. Political Geography, 867 
16(2) 93–97. 868 
36 
Dierwechter, Y. (2020) ‘Urbanisations’ of green geopolitics: new state spaces in global 869 
unsustainability. In: S. Moisio, N. Koch, A. Jonas, C. Lizotte, and J. Luukkonen (eds.) 870 
Handbook on Changing Geographies of the State: New Spaces of Geopolitics. 871 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 398–411. 872 
Dodds, K. (2018) Narrating territory, politics and governance. Territory, Politics, 873 
Governance, 6(4) 401–404. 874 
Dubois, A. and Gadde, L.E. (2002) Systematic combining: An abductive approach to case 875 
research. Journal of Business Research, 55(7) 553–560. 876 
Eakin, H.C., Lemos, M.C. and Nelson, D.R. (2014) Differentiating capacities as a means to 877 
sustainable climate change adaptation. Global Environmental Change, 27(1) 1–8. 878 
Evans, J.P. (2011) Resilience, ecology and adaptation in the experimental city. Transactions 879 
of the Institute of British Geographers, 36(2) 223–237. Available from https://rgs-880 
ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00420.x [accessed 13 881 
July 2020]. 882 
Forsyth, T. (2012) Politicizing Environmental Science Does Not Mean Denying Climate 883 
Science Nor Endorsing It Without Question. Global Environmental Politics, 12(2) 18–884 
23. 885 
Frantzeskaki, N. (2019) How City‐networks are Shaping and Failing Innovations in Urban 886 
Institutions for Sustainability and Resilience. Global Policy, 10(4) 712–714. Available 887 
from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12758 [accessed 13 888 
July 2020]. 889 
Gillard, R., Gouldson, A., Paavola, J. and Van Alstine, J. (2017) Can national policy 890 
blockages accelerate the development of polycentric governance? Evidence from 891 
climate change policy in the United Kingdom. Global Environmental Change, 45 174–892 
182. 893 
37 
Gleditsch, N. and Nordås, R. (2014) Conflicting messages? The IPCC on conflict and human 894 
security. Political Geography, 43 82–90. 895 
Göpfert, C., Wamsler, C. and Lang, W. (2019) A framework for the joint institutionalization 896 
of climate change mitigation and adaptation in city administrations. Mitigation and 897 
Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 24(1) 1–21. Available from 898 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-018-9789-9 [accessed 13 July 2020]. 899 
Grove, K. (2014) Biopolitics and Adaptation: Governing Socio-Ecological Contingency 900 
Through Climate Change and Disaster Studies. Geography Compass, 8(3) 198–210. 901 
Grove, K. (2016) Catastrophe Insurance and the Biopolitics of Climate Change Adaptation. 902 
In: S. O’Lear and S. Dalby (eds.) Reframing climate change : constructing ecological 903 
geopolitics. First London and New York: Routledge, 171–187. 904 
Haarstad, H. (2014) Climate Change, Environmental Governance and the Scale Problem. 905 
Geography Compass, 8(2) 87–97. 906 
Hajer, M. and Versteeg, W. (2019) Imagining the post-fossil city: why is it so difficult to 907 
think of new possible worlds? Territory, Politics, Governance, 7(2) 122–134. Available 908 
from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21622671.2018.1510339 [accessed 909 
13 July 2020]. 910 
Hare, W., Stockwell, C., Flachsland, C. and Oberthür, S. (2010) The architecture of the 911 
global climate regime: A top-down perspective. Climate Policy, 10(6) 600–614. 912 
Harmer, N. (2018) Crude geopolitics: territory and governance in post-peak oil imaginaries. 913 
Territory, Politics, Governance, 6(4) 405–428. 914 
van der Heijden, J. (2019) Studying urban climate governance: Where to begin, what to look 915 
for, and how to make a meaningful contribution to scholarship and practice. Earth 916 
System Governance, 1 100005. 917 
Hölscher, K., Frantzeskaki, N. and Loorbach, D. (2019) Steering transformations under 918 
38 
climate change: capacities for transformative climate governance and the case of 919 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Regional Environmental Change, 19(3) 791–805. Available 920 
from https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-018-1329-3 [accessed 13 July 2020]. 921 
Huitema, D., Adger, W., Berkhout, F., Massey, E., Mazmanian, D., Munaretto, S., Plummer, 922 
R. and Termeer, C.C.J.A.M. (2016) The governance of adaptation: choices, reasons, and 923 
effects. Introduction to the Special Feature. Ecology and Society, 21(3) art37. Available 924 
from http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol21/iss3/art37/ [accessed 28 May 2018]. 925 
IPCC (2014a) Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global 926 
and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report 927 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 928 
IPCC (2014b) II Annex II Glossary. Geneva, Switzerland: . 929 
IPCC (2014c) Summary for policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 930 
and Vulnerability.Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group 931 
II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 932 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 933 
32. 934 
Jasanoff, S. and Wynne, B. (1998) Science and decisionmaking. Human choice and climate 935 
change. In: S. Rayner and E.L. Malone (eds.) Human choice and climate change 1: the 936 
societal framework. Colombus, Ohio: Batelle Press, 1–87. 937 
Jessop, B. (2016) Territory, Politics, Governance and Multispatial Metagovernance. 938 
Territory, Politics, Governance, 4(1) 8–32. 939 
Jessop, B., Brenner, N. and Jones, M. (2008) Theorizing sociospatial relations. Environment 940 
and Planning D: Society and Space, 26(3) 389–401. Available from 941 
http://epd.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1068/d9107 [accessed 31 October 2016]. 942 
Johnson, C.A. (2018a) Cities as Saviours? The Global Politics of Urban Climate Mitigation. 943 
39 
In: The Power of Cities in Global Climate Politics. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 49–90. 944 
Johnson, C.A. (2018b) Resilient Cities? The Global Politics of Urban Climate. In: The Power 945 
of Cities in Global Climate Politics. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 91–146. 946 
Johnson, C.A. (2018c) The Power of Cities in Global Climate Politics. Palgrave Macmillan 947 
UK. 948 
Jonas, A.E.G. (2006) Pro scale: further reflections on the ‘scale debate’ in human geography. 949 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 31(3) 399–406. Available from 950 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2006.00210.x. 951 
Jonas, A.E.G., Gibbs, D. and While, A. (2011) The new urban politics as a politics of carbon 952 
control G. MacLeod and M. Jones (eds.). Urban Studies, 48(12) 2537–2554. 953 
Jonas, A.E.G. and Moisio, S. (2018) City regionalism as geopolitical processes: A new 954 
framework for analysis. Progress in Human Geography, 42(3) 350–370. Available from 955 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0309132516679897 [accessed 4 August 2018]. 956 
Jordan, A.J., Huitema, D., Hildén, M., van Asselt, H., Rayner, T.J., Schoenefeld, J., Tosun, J., 957 
Forster, J. and Boasson, E.L. (2015) Emergence of polycentric climate governance and 958 
its future prospects. Nature Climate Change, 5(11) 977–982. 959 
Kahn, M.E. (2013) The geopolitics of climate change: An economist’s perspective. Political 960 
Geography, 37 53–55. 961 
Keohane, R.O. and Victor, D.G. (2016) Cooperation and discord in global climate policy. 962 
Nature Climate Change, Available from 963 
http://www.nature.com.abc.cardiff.ac.uk/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate29964 
37.html [accessed 10 May 2016]. 965 
Kivimaa, P., Hildén, M., Huitema, D., Jordan, A. and Newig, J. (2017) Experiments in 966 
climate governance – A systematic review of research on energy and built environment 967 
transitions. Journal of Cleaner Production, 169 17–29. 968 
40 
Kreuder-Sonnen, C. and Zangl, B. (2015) Which post-Westphalia? International 969 
organizations between constitutionalism and authoritarianism. European Journal of 970 
International Relations, 21(3) 568–594. Available from 971 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066114548736 [accessed 13 July 2020]. 972 
Kurtz, H.E. (2003) Scale frames and counter-scale frames: constructing the problem of 973 
environmental injustice. Political Geography, 22(8) 887–916. 974 
Kythreotis, A.P. (2012) Progress in global climate change politics? Reasserting national state 975 
territoriality in a ‘post-political’ world. Progress in Human Geography, 36(4). 976 
Kythreotis, A.P. (2018) Reimagining the urban as dystopic resilient spaces: scalar 977 
materialities in climate knowledge, planning and politics. In: K. Ward, A. Jonas, B. 978 
Miller, and D. Wilson (eds.) The Routledge Handbook on Spaces of Urban Politics. 979 
Routledge International Handbooks. London: Routledge, 612. 980 
Kythreotis, A.P. and Jonas, A.E.G. (2012) Scaling sustainable development? How voluntary 981 
groups negotiate spaces of sustainability governance in the United Kingdom. 982 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 30(3) 381–399. Available from 983 
http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=d11810 [accessed 17 July 2016]. 984 
Kythreotis, A.P., Jonas, A.E.G. and Howarth, C. (2020) Locating climate adaptation in urban 985 
and regional studies. Regional Studies, 54(4) 576–588. 986 
Kythreotis, A.P. and Mercer, T.G. (n.d.) Education as a new urban civil politics of climate 987 
change. In: V. Castán Broto, E. Robin, and A. While (eds.) Climate urbanism: towards a 988 
critical research agenda. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK,. 989 
Lawrence, J., Sullivan, F., Lash, A., Ide, G., Cameron, C. and McGlinchey, L. (2015) 990 
Adapting to changing climate risk by local government in New Zealand: institutional 991 
practice barriers and enablers. Local Environment, 20(3) 298–320. 992 
Leitner, H., Sheppard, E., Webber, S. and Colven, E. (2018) Globalizing urban resilience. 993 
41 
Urban Geography 39 (8) p.1276–1284. 994 
Maor, M., Tosun, J. and Jordan, A. (2017) Proportionate and disproportionate policy 995 
responses to climate change: core concepts and empirical applications. Journal of 996 
Environmental Policy and Planning, 19(6) 599–611. 997 
Marston, S.A., Jones, J.P. and Woodward, K. (2005) Human geography without scale. 998 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 30(4) 416–432. Available from 999 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2005.00180.x [accessed 11 July 2018]. 1000 
Massey, E. and Huitema, D. (2012) The emergence of climate change adaptation as a policy 1001 
field: the case of England. Regional Environmental Change, 1–12. 1002 
Menkes, J. and Menkes, M. (2010) International Organisations, Climate Change 1003 
Expectations, and the Reality of Institutionalisation – An Analysis of the United Nations 1004 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Polish Yearbook of 1005 
International Law, 29 115–137. Available from 1006 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2174018 [accessed 13 July 2020]. 1007 
Moisio, S. (2018) Geopolitics of the Knowledge-Based Economy. Regions and Cities. Taylor 1008 
& Francis. 1009 
Moisio, S., Jonas, A.E.G., Koch, N., Lizotte, C. and Luukkonen, J. (2020) Changing 1010 
geographies of the state: themes, challenges and futures. In: S. Moisio, N. Koch, A. 1011 
Jonas, C. Lizotte, and J. Luukkonen (eds.) Handbook on Changing Geographies of the 1012 
State: New Spaces of Geopolitics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1–28. 1013 
Nelson, D., Adger, W. and Brown, K. (2007) Adaptation to Environmental Change: 1014 
Contributions of a Resilience Framework. Annual Review of Environment and 1015 
Resources, 32 395–419. 1016 
Nightingale, A.J. (2017) Power and politics in climate change adaptation efforts: Struggles 1017 
over authority and recognition in the context of political instability. Geoforum, 84 11–1018 
42 
20. Available from 1019 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001671851730129X [accessed 27 1020 
June 2017]. 1021 
O’Brien, K. (2012) Global environmental change II: From adaptation to deliberate 1022 
transformation. Progress in Human Geography, 36(5) 667–676. 1023 
O’Brien, K. and Leichenko, R. (2000) Double exposure: Assessing the impacts of climate 1024 
change within the context of economic globalization. Global Environmental Change, 1025 
10(3) 221–232. 1026 
O’Lear, S. (2016a) Climate science and slow violence: A view from political geography and 1027 
STS on mobilizing technoscientific ontologies of climate change. Political Geography, 1028 
52 4–13. 1029 
O’Lear, S. (2016b) Geopolitics and climate science: The case of the missing embodied 1030 
carbon. In: Reframing Climate Change: Constructing Ecological Geopolitics. 1031 
Routledge, 100–115. 1032 
Oosterlynck, S. and González, S. (2013) ‘Don’t Waste a Crisis’: Opening up the City Yet 1033 
Again for Neoliberal Experimentation. International Journal of Urban and Regional 1034 
Research, 37(3) 1075–1082. 1035 
Ostrom, E. (2009) A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change. SSRN 1036 
Electronic Journal,. 1037 
Ostrom, E. (2010) Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global 1038 
environmental change. Global Environmental Change, 20(4) 550–557. 1039 
Phelps, N.A. and Miao, J.T. (2020) Varieties of urban entrepreneurialism. Dialogues in 1040 
Human Geography, 204382061989043. Available from 1041 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2043820619890438 [accessed 13 July 2020]. 1042 
Pielke Jr, R.A., Prins, G., Rayner, S. and Sarewitz, D. (2007) Lifting the Taboo on 1043 
43 
Adaptation. Nature, 445 597–598. 1044 
Porter, J.J., Demeritt, D. and Dessai, S. (2015) The right stuff? informing adaptation to 1045 
climate change in British Local Government. Global Environmental Change, 35 411–1046 
422. Available from 1047 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378015300625. 1048 
Purdon, M. (2015) Advancing Comparative Climate Change Politics: Theory and Method. 1049 
Global Environmental Politics, 15(3) 1–26. Available from 1050 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/GLEP_e_00309 [accessed 10 September 2016]. 1051 
Rauken, T., Mydske, P.K. and Winsvold, M. (2014) Mainstreaming climate change 1052 
adaptation at the local level. Local Environment, 20(4) 408–423. Available from 1053 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13549839.2014.880412 [accessed 13 July 1054 
2020]. 1055 
Rice, J.L. (2010) Climate, carbon, and territory: Greenhouse gas mitigation in Seattle, 1056 
Washington. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 100(4) 929–937. 1057 
Available from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00045608.2010.502434 1058 
[accessed 13 July 2020]. 1059 
Rickards, L. and Howden, S.M. (2012) Transformational adaptation: agriculture and climate 1060 
change. Crop and Pasture Science, 63(3) 240. Available from 1061 
http://www.publish.csiro.au/?paper=CP11172 [accessed 15 July 2020]. 1062 
Salvidge, S. (2016) Environment Agency closes climate change advice service. 1063 
Schipper, E.L.F. (2006) Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC Process. Review 1064 
of European Community & International Environmental Law, 15(1) 82–92. Available 1065 
from http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9388.2006.00501.x [accessed 10 September 1066 
2016]. 1067 
Swyngedouw, E. (2010) Apocalypse Forever?: Post-political Populism and the Spectre of 1068 
44 
Climate Change. Theory, Culture & Society, 27(2–3) 213–232. 1069 
Swyngedouw, E. (2007) Impossible ‘sustainability’ and the postpolitical condition. In: R. 1070 
Krueger and D. Gibbs (eds.) The sustainable development paradox : urban political 1071 
economy in the United States and Europe. New York ; London: Guilford, 13–40. 1072 
Swyngedouw, E. (2013) The Non-political Politics of Climate Change. ACME: An 1073 
International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 12(1) 1–8. 1074 
Torney, D. (2019) Follow the leader? Conceptualising the relationship between leaders and 1075 
followers in polycentric climate governance. Environmental Politics, 28(1) 167–186. 1076 
Urwin, K. and Jordan, A. (2008) Does public policy support or undermine climate change 1077 
adaptation? Exploring policy interplay across different scales of governance. Global 1078 
Environmental Change, 18(1) 180–191. Available from 1079 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378007000611. 1080 
Valentine, G. (2005) Tell me about…: Using interviews as a research methodology. In: R. 1081 
Flowerdew and D. Martin (eds.) Methods in human geography. Harlow: Pearson, 110–1082 
127. 1083 
Wachsmuth, D. (2017) Competitive multi-city regionalism: growth politics beyond the 1084 
growth machine. Regional Studies, 51(4) 643–653. Available from 1085 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00343404.2016.1223840 [accessed 4 1086 
August 2018]. 1087 
While, A., Jonas, A.E.G. and Gibbs, D. (2010) From sustainable development to carbon 1088 
control: eco-state restructuring and the politics of urban and regional development. 1089 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 35(1) 76–93. Available from 1090 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2009.00362.x [accessed 1 November 2016]. 1091 
Wolfram, M., van der Heijden, J., Juhola, S. and Patterson, J. (2019) Learning in urban 1092 
climate governance: concepts, key issues and challenges. Journal of Environmental 1093 
45 
Policy and Planning, 21(1) 1–15. Available from 1094 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1523908X.2018.1558848 [accessed 13 1095 
July 2020]. 1096 
Woon, C.Y. (2019) Translating Territory, Politics and Governance. Territory, Politics, 1097 
Governance, 7(2) 115–121. 1098 
Wurzel, R., Moulton, J.F.G., Osthorst, W., Mederake, L., Deutz, P. and Jonas, A.E.G. (2019) 1099 
Climate pioneership and leadership in structurally disadvantaged maritime port cities. 1100 
Environmental Politics, 28(1) 146–166. 1101 
 1102 
 1103 
